The 
Introduction
The United States of America (the US) has developed one of the most progressive and effective anti-market abuse enforcement frameworks in recent years. 1 For example, at a federal level, its anti-market abuse enforcement framework involves self-regulatory organisations as well as private actions that enhance compliance with the law and facilitate the levying of sanctions against offenders. 2 Put differently, rigorous enforcement is the key component of the US's market abuse regulation that makes it unique from similar regulation in other countries. 3 Consequently, the US's anti-market abuse enforcement approaches have influenced the regulation of market abuse in a number of countries, including South Africa. 4 Given this background, the detection, prosecution and enforcement measures adopted in the US will be briefly discussed and, where applicable, contrasted with similar enforcement methods in South Africa in order to recommend possible anti-market abuse enforcement measures that could be employed to increase the curbing of market abuse 5 activities in South Africa. 6 This is done by, first, examining the role of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) in relation to the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in the US. Secondly, the role of the Department of Justice (the DOJ) and the courts in relation to the enforcement of the market abuse ban in the US will be analysed. Lastly, a similar analysis in respect of other selected self-regulatory organisations will be undertaken.
Detection, Prosecution and the Enforcement of the Market Abuse Prohibition

The Role of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
The responsibility for civil and administrative enforcement of the market abuse prohibition rests primarily with the SEC. 7 Nevertheless, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC) has the prerogative to oversee and enforce the prohibition relating to commodities derivatives and futures market abuse practices. 8 Notwithstanding the fact that there are several other regulatory bodies, 9 the SEC was established as an independent quasi-judicial and legislative regulatory board responsible for the enforcement of federal securities laws through the regulation of the stock market and securities industry in the US. 10 The SEC's legislative powers include promulgating rules and regulations that have the force of law. 11 The SEC may, for instance, issue interpretive letters and the so-called no-action letters to express its views and provide guidance to all the relevant persons regarding any market abuse violations. 12 Moreover, the SEC's judicial functions include acting as an original tribunal regarding disciplinary actions against securities professionals subject to its supervision who violate securities laws or commit market abuse offences. 13 In addition to its quasi-judicial and legislative functions, the SEC further exercises administrative and supervisory authority over the key participants in the securities industry to prevent and combat market abuse activities in the US. 14 The SEC is also responsible for protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly and efficient financial markets through facilitating capital formation and effectively enforcing securities laws to curb fraud, insider trading, market manipulation and other related market abuse practices. For purposes of effectiveness, the SEC is divided into four main divisions, namely the Corporate Finance, Market Regulation, Investment Management and Enforcement Divisions.
The Corporate Finance Division polices compliance with the mandatory disclosure requirement as well as registration by public companies of transactions such as mergers. It additionally operates an online Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval system (the EDGAR system) to ensure equal access to non-public inside information for all relevant persons. This system has been successfully utilised to prevent possible insider trading and market manipulation in the US's financial markets. 15 Moreover, the Market Regulation Division regulates the NYSE, the NASD, the MSRMB and other self-regulatory organisations. In relation to this, Market Regulation Division interprets any proposed changes to regulations, publicises investment-related topics for public education and monitors operations of the industry. In practice, the SEC delegates SALJ 437 441-460; Van Deventer "New watchdog for insider trading" 1999 FSB Bulletin 2 3; Beuthin & Luiz Beuthin's Basic Company Law (2000) 235-238; Luiz "Market Abuse and the Enforcement Committee" 2011 SA Merc LJ 151-172; Luiz "Insider Trading Regulation -If at First You Don't Succeed…" 1999 SA Merc LJ 136 136-151; Henning & Du Toit "The Regulation of False Trading, Market Manipulation and Insider Trading" 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 155 155-165 & Osode "The Regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Public Choice Perspective" 1999 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 688 688-708. 7 Ashe & Counsell Insider Trading: The Tangled Web (1990) 7-12; Langevoort & Gulati "The Muddled Duty to Disclose under Rule 10b-5" 2004 Vand L Rev 1639 1639 -1680 PL-111-257 (approved 05-10-2010) see Hazen Federal Securities Law (2003) 4-7. 12 Generally see s 14(a) to (e) of the Securities Exchange Act. Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation 29; 415; [433] [434] [435] [436] [437] [438] [439] [440] [441] [442] [443] [444] most of its enforcement and rulemaking authority to the NYSE and the NASD. 16 Notably, these two self-regulatory organisations merged to form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority in 2007. 17 The Investment Management Division oversees investment companies and their advisory professionals. It further administers federal security laws to improve the disclosure of non-public inside information and to minimise prejudice to investors without imposing an undue burden on regulated companies. Therefore, the SEC can interpret such laws and make rules to reduce the occurrence of market abuse practices in the relevant financial markets as much as possible. 18 Likewise, the Enforcement Division investigates any violation of the laws and rules that govern insider trading, market manipulation and other related practices. Its extensive investigatory powers include issuing subpoenae for the production of relevant evidence such as documents, and compelling suspects and others to testify in the courts. Furthermore, it has powers to:
( Lewis "2009 Year in Review: SEC and SRO Selected Enforcement Cases and Developments Regarding Broker-Dealers" 2010 4-6 <http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 10-06-2013 . 18 Palmiter Securities Regulation 28-31. 19 S 929P(b) read with (c) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat.1376 (12 USC; s 5301 et seq.) , hereinafter referred to as the Dodd-Frank Act; also see Morrison & Foerster "Insider Trading" 2010 Year End Review 1 14-15. 20 See s 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act which enacted s 21F to repeal and replace s 21A(e) of the Securities Exchange Act; see further Morrison & Foerster 2010 Year End Review 12-14. 21 Dooley "Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions" 1980 Virginia Law Review 1 60-83; Carlton & Fischel "The Regulation of Insider Trading" 1983 Stanford Law Review 857 857-895 & Bainbridge Corporation Law and Economics (2002) 571-573. 22 Notably, this SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Company (1968) 401 F2d 833 (2d Cir); Dirks v SEC (1983) 463 US 646 646-655; Chiarella v United States (1980) 445 US 222; US v Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic (2006) 433 F3d 273; SEC v Galleon Management & others (2009) Lewis 2010 2-4 & 7-13 <http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 10-06-2013 . 23 <http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2010.pdf> (accessed 30-01-2014) .
Civ 8811(SDNY); SEC v Arthur J Cutillo & others (2009) Civ 9208 (SDNY) & SEC v Anthony Fareri & others (2009) Civ 80360 (SDFla); generally see further related analysis and/or discussion of the SEC's enforcement statistics as summarised in Morgan
In order to combat cross-border market abuse activities, the SEC entered into non-binding co-operative agreements (Memoranda of Understanding) with similar foreign securities regulatory bodies. These Memoranda of Understanding (the MOUs) permit the SEC to request such foreign regulators to investigate and provide it with certain information in circumstances in which the SEC will not be able to do so itself. 24 Likewise, the SEC can also aid other foreign regulators' investigations even when no US legislation would have been violated by the occurrence of the illicit conduct in question in the US's financial markets. 25 The SEC may further sanction market participants who engage in activities that are deemed illegal in other countries, even if such activities are not illegal or deemed manipulative, misleading or deceptive in the US. 26 Additionally, the SEC's international co-operation and extra-territorial enforcement powers are enhanced by the fact that it is a member of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (the IOSCO). 27 As indicated above, the SEC has been very instrumental in the enforcement of the market abuse ban in the US. For instance, apart from being tasked with the responsibility to enforce the civil and administrative sanctions, the SEC supervises other participants in the securities industry and the self-regulatory organisations. This enabled the SEC to score a number of victories in the civil enforcement of market abuse in the US to date. 28 Moreover, the SEC recently tightened and improved its enforcement in the aftermath of the World Com, Enron and other related market abuse cases. For example, it imposed a civil monetary fine of $2, 25 billion on World Com in 2005 for the misuse of inside information and other related securities law violations, like corporate financial fraud. 29 The SEC further imposed civil monetary fines of $250 million on Qwest Communications, $100 million on the Royal Dutch/Shell company and $100 million in the Bristol-Myers Squibb case for insider trading and other related securities law violations like financial misrepresentation. 30 The SEC further imposed 987 administrative sanctions (cease or desist orders, censures and suspension orders) against market abuse offenders during the period between 1978 and 2004. 31 The SEC has also successfully and consistently managed to bring several enforcement actions against the insider trading offenders during the period between 2004 and 2010 as evidenced in figure 1 below. 32 //www.ssrn.com/abstract=933333> (accessed 28-09-2013) . 32 Figure 1 was adapted from <http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading.shtml> (accessed 30-11-2013 Lewis 2010 7-13 <http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 10-06-2013 .
On the other hand, the Financial Services Board (the FSB) 34 has almost similar functions as those of the SEC. 35 In other words, the FSB, like the SEC, bears the main responsibility to oversee and enforce the securities and market abuse laws in South Africa. It is not very clear whether the FSB is also statutorily responsible for enforcing the prohibition on commodities-based market manipulation in South Africa. Moreover, there is no specific regulatory body like the CFTC 36 which is statutorily authorised to deal effectively and exclusively with the commodities-based market manipulation violations in South Africa. 37 Strikingly, this flaw has still not been corrected by the Financial Markets Act. 38 Like the SEC, 39 the FSB also has quasi-legislative (rulemaking) authority. 40 The FSB may, for instance, make market abuse rules after consulting with the Directorate of Market Abuse (the DMA). 41 In addition, the FSB exercises administrative and supervisory authority over the DMA, the Enforcement Committee (the EC) and other relevant securities market participants. In spite of these positive developments, most of the market abuse rules that could be made by the FSB are only limited to the general manner in which its administrative powers and roles should be conducted. 42 To ensure more compliance and to enhance the enforcement of the market abuse ban, the FSB delegates some of its roles to the DMA, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited (the JSE) and the EC. The DMA 43 deals primarily with the market abuse investigations, the JSE offers surveillance support for the detection of market abuse activity and the EC oversees the enforcement of the administrative sanctions. 44 Nevertheless, the FSB does not have its own surveillance systems or other mechanisms like the SEC's EDGAR 45 to detect and prevent market abuse activity in the South African financial markets. 46 In contrast with the SEC, 47 the FSB is still to employ other additional relevant measures to discourage and curb cross-border market abuse activities. 48 Additionally, unlike the SEC, 49 the FSB has not been able to investigate and/or successfully obtain timeous enforcement settlements consistently in market abuse cases as evidenced in figure 1 and table 1 below. 
The Role of the Department of Justice and the Courts
The DOJ or the federal courts have the prerogative to enforce the criminal sanctions for market abuse in the US. 52 Notably, the DOJ may only prosecute any criminal cases for market abuse referred to it by the SEC. 53 In spite of this referral procedure, the DOJ and the federal courts play a very important role in the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in the US. This is supported in part by the current rigorous enforcement and prosecution of such practices in the US's competent courts. In other words, the significant number of reported cases indicates that such courts are effectively enforcing the market abuse prohibition in the US. For example, in the Drexel Burnham Lambert scandal of 1990, Kimba Wood J sentenced Michael Milken to ten years imprisonment or a criminal fine of $200 million and ordered him to pay a $400 million civil disgorgement of profits fine. Dennis Levine was sentenced to two years in prison, or a fine of $11, 5 million while Ivan F. Boesky was sentenced to three years imprisonment, or a fine of $50 million. Milken eventually paid the criminal fine of $200 million and $400 million civil disgorgement profits fine. Dennis Levine paid the $11, 5 million civil disgorgement of profits fine and Ivan F. Boesky later paid the $50 million civil disgorgement fine and an additional $50 million civil penalty. 54 In US v O'Hagan 55 the accused person's plea of not guilty to insider trading charges was rejected and it was held that the breach of a fiduciary duty by corporate insiders could further involve the breach of a duty of trust and confidence on the part of such insiders or other shareholders of a corporation whose securities are traded. Moreover, in The Trane Company v O'Connor Securities 56 it was held that market manipulation should be discouraged and prohibited to promote open and free markets which allow natural forces of supply and demand to determine the prices of securities. This was also echoed in United States v Brown, 57 which postulated that market manipulation negatively affects the price of listed securities and, in so doing, it misleads and prejudices outside investors.
The successful prosecution of market abuse practices involving World Com, Martha Stewart, Tyco, Parmalat and Enron cases is further testimony of the effectiveness and competence of the US's federal courts. 58 59 
See the judgement of the US District Court SD Texas Houston Division in the case of in re Enron Corporation Securities Derivative and "ERISA"Litigation Plaintiffs v Enron Corp Oregon Corporation Defendants (2006) WL 2795321 (SD Tex).
competent personnel were allocated to them. 60 As highlighted above, the DOJ and the competent courts play a major role in enforcing the market abuse ban in the US. Federal courts have to date managed to radically and rigorously prosecute a number of cases involving market abuse practices like insider trading and market manipulation. 61 The courts have further imposed about 2262 permanent injunctions against individuals and another 321 injunctions against companies (juristic persons) between the years 1978 and 2004. 62 About 574 executive persons were barred from working as officers and directors of public corporations and 415 were barred from serving as financial professionals by both the SEC and the courts during the same period. 63 Furthermore, about 755 individuals and 40 companies were indicated, 543 of the individuals were convicted and only ten were acquitted. In the same vein, the DOJ formed the Corporate Fraud Task Force (the CFTF) and consequently, a number of market abuse activities have been successfully detected and prosecuted to date. 64 In light of this, one can conclude that the US has so far been fairly successful in combating market abuse and other illicit practices. Nonetheless, there is no empirical evidence that explicitly indicates that market abuse activities have either been significantly reduced or completely eradicated in the US's financial markets as a result of deterrence and/or effective enforcement. 65 In contrast with the position in the US, 66 it has already been pointed out that very few cases of market abuse have, to date, been successfully prosecuted and settled in South Africa. 67 Moreover, unlike the US's DOJ and courts, 68 the Director of Public Prosecutions (the DPP) and the competent courts in South Africa have, to some extent, struggled to obtain more convictions in market abuse cases to date. 69 Notwithstanding the efforts being made by the FSB to refer the criminal cases of market abuse to the DPP for prosecution, only a few competent courts 70 have jurisdiction to hear such cases. This has, to some extent, restricted or resulted in delays in the prosecution of some market abuse cases in South Africa. 71 Moreover, some of the market abuse cases that were referred to the DPP by the FSB are still pending while others have either been withdrawn or abandoned, possibly because of insufficient evidence and the backlog of other cases in the relevant courts. 72
The Role of Other Selected Self-Regulatory Organisations
Although individual persons are entitled to claim their damages directly from the offenders in private litigation, the selfregulatory organisations have to date played a key role in the civil enforcement of the market abuse prohibition and speedy provision of appropriate remedies to all the affected persons in the US.
As stated earlier, 73 the SEC, through its Market Regulation Division, has a broad Congressional mandate to 60 The federal courts have also successfully prosecuted market manipulation practices. See US v Milken (1990) oversee the day-to-day regulation of securities market participants by the self-regulatory organisations like the NYSE, the NASD, the MSRMB and other broker-dealer companies and investment houses. 74 Therefore, the SEC inspects the selfregulatory organisations and performs targeted oversight examinations of their broker-dealer members to determine whether such self-regulatory organisations are effectively supervising the financial regulations and business practices of their members. 75 The NASD administers the registration of new issuers of securities and has the authority to promulgate rules governing voluntary membership of broker-dealers in over the counter markets such as the NASD Automated Quotation System. 76 In order to improve the enforcement of securities laws and to curb market abuse activity among its members, the NASD divided itself into two subsidiaries, namely the NASD Regulation Inc 77 and the NASD Automated Quotation System Public Market Inc. 78 Each of these subsidiaries has its own independent board of directors. 79 The NASD s has further authority to make rules aimed at preventing market abuse activities by market participants like research and financial market analysts. 80 Moreover, the NYSE is the largest securities exchange in the US responsible for monitoring the public trading of listed securities to minimise the occurrence of potential market abuse practices in the US's financial markets. This is done by operating special computerised devices and surveillance systems to detect and prevent market abuse practices. The NYSE is further empowered to make rules or to take other action reasonably necessary to discourage market abuse activities in the US's financial markets. 81 The NYSE and the NASD merged to form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (the FINRA) in 2007. 82 In 2009, the FINRA created the Office of Fraud Detection and Market Intelligence, the Office of the Whistle-blower, the Office of Disciplinary Affairs and the Central Review Group for the speedy investigation of any suspected violations and to review tips from whistle-blowers in order to root out fraud, insider trading, market manipulation and other related market abuse practices in the US's financial markets. 83 The MSRMB was established in 1975 to supervise the companies involved in the underwriting and trading of municipal securities. Although its rules are usually monitored and enforced by the SEC, the MSRMB is authorised to make its own additional market abuse enforcement rules and to impose any appropriate action against the securities laws (including State Blue Sky Laws) and market abuse violators. 84 As highlighted above, it is clear that the self-regulatory organisations have contributed immensely towards the effective enforcement of securities laws to curb market abuse and other illicit trading practices in the US. In addition to the self-regulatory organisations, there are currently more than ten federal, state and industry regulatory bodies in the US. This suggests that there is good competition among the regulators to regulate certain securities products and the industry effectively and efficiently. 85 Accordingly, self-regulatory organisations like the CFTC, the NASD, the NYSE and the FINRA may impose their own civil or administrative penalties against any person who violates the federal securities laws by engaging in market abuse and other illegal activities. 86 This allows the US's market abuse regime to bring multiple enforcement actions against the offenders in all its financial markets. 87 In South Africa, apart from the FSB and its committees, other regulatory bodies like the JSE may also enforce the market abuse ban. Accordingly, like the SEC, 88 the FSB may exercise supervisory authority over all the regulatory bodies that deal with market abuse in South Africa. 89 In the same vein, as stated before, 90 the FSB has a prerogative to make market abuse rules that govern the enforcement of market abuse laws in South Africa. 91 Apart from the FSB and the JSE, there are no self-regulatory organisations that are specifically responsible for enforcing market abuse laws in South Africa. 92 In relation to this, there is no specific provision in the Financial Markets Act which empowers other self-regulatory organisations to enforce the market abuse ban in South Africa. 93 While this approach is good in that it minimises bureaucracy, balkanisation, conflict of interests and confusion that may be associated with many regulatory bodies and self-regulatory organisations, it has not been fully utilised to obtain more settlements and prosecutions of market abuse cases in South Africa to date. 94
Concluding Remarks
The article has revealed that both the US and the South African market abuse regimes maintain similar enforcement goals and missions. 95 In spite of this, they adopt and implement very different approaches to achieve their enforcement goals and/or targets. Put differently, the US's anti-market abuse enforcement framework employs the multi-functional regulatory approach which offers competition among the regulatory authorities at a federal level, 96 but nevertheless resulting in far greater and effective enforcement. Moreover, the US's anti-market abuse enforcement framework provides the much needed resources, competent personnel in the courts and the SEC as well as better technological surveillance mechanisms to detect illicit trading practices. 97 On the contrary, notwithstanding the fact that the South African market abuse legislation was relatively influenced by the corresponding legislation in the US, it sometimes lacks a rigorous practical enforcement approach and infrastructure to combat market abuse activities. 98 Consequently, it is submitted that the DPP should introduce more specialised courts or tribunals that are staffed with judges and other persons with the relevant expertise to hear and/or prosecute market abuse cases in South Africa timeously and effectively. Furthermore, the Protection of Funds Act and/or the Financial Markets Act should be reviewed to enact provisions that expressly empower the EC to make its own market abuse rules to enhance the combating of market abuse practices in South Africa. Lastly, notwithstanding the potentially negative effects of bureaucracy, balkanisation and conflict of interests that may be associated with many regulatory bodies, it is submitted that more self-regulatory organisations should be statutorily empowered to impose their own penalties and/or take any other appropriate action against market abuse offenders in South Africa. (1977) Thesis and dissertations
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